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HIND AHMED ZAKI
EL-SISSI’S WOMEN?  
SHIFTING GENDER DISCOURSES AND 
THE LIMITS OF STATE FEMINISM
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the overthrow of former President Morsi amid massive demons-trations through June and July 2013, a speciic new gender discourse began 
emerging in Egypt. Focusing on the high levels of participation of women 
from all wakes of life in the demonstrations against Islamist rule in Egypt, this 
new popular discourse is articulated in vernacular forms of expression, in the 
media, or in the writings of intellectuals and political analysts. It stresses the 
supposedly unanimous and uncontested support of “Egyptian women” as a 
uniform category, to the Egyptian military in their war against Islamic terro-
rism and to the military State, as well as their purportedly universal infatuation 
with President Abd El-Fattah El-Sissi. This indicates the rise of a new discursive 
form of State feminism, one that seeks to erase a rich four-year history of 
diverse gender-based mobilization. 
This article deconstructs the myth of “El-Sissi’s women” in reference to partic-
ular models of gendered imaginations of the nation-State and Egyptian women in 
the twentieth century, as well as their political expressions – and to the emerging 
“revolutionary” representation of women since 2011. These images and narra-
tives allow us to decode the media-borne myth of “El-Sissi’s women” and analyze 
it as an attempt to construct a new and disturbing discursive form of State femi-
nism. The politicization of women’s images – dancing in front of ballot boxes in 
the 2014 presidential elections or expressing support for their favorite candidate 
El-Sissi in videos – is part of this emerging discursive attempt to mask the multi-
tude of claims women address to the State and of readings of women’s rights. By 
constructing the image of “Egyptian women” as a uniied category and silencing 
alternative and independent voices, this new State feminism instrumentalizes 
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women and their issues for political purposes in this period of sharp political and 
identity-based polarization, while giving them little in return.
INTRODUCTION
On the eve of Egypt’s 2014 presidential election, queues of voters stood patiently 
under May’s burning sun, waiting to cast their votes. Among those waiting, the 
high presence of women was quite remarkable and remarked upon. 1 During 
the irst day of the election, videos of Egyptian women from all walks of life 
dancing in celebration at the polls circulated widely on social media. 2
Such expressions of support came as the last in a series of media portrayals 
designed to evoke the “gendered” factor in the June 30th revolution/coup. 
Women’s supposed infatuation with the military-backed candidate, Abd 
El-Fattah El-Sissi was repeatedly commented on, and slightly made fun of, by 
local and international media. Such images of women’s jubilation came at a 
time when the idea that women played a massive role in toppling the rule of 
Muslim Brotherhood was gaining a great deal of ground.
Less than a fortnight later, a video of a woman being sexually assaulted by 
a group of men at the inaugural celebrations for Egypt’s new President, sur-
faced online. Graphic footage, apparently ilmed using a mobile phone, 
shows a mob of men surrounding the young woman, who was stripped of her 
clothes and badly bruised. The video circulated widely on social media web-
sites. 3 While women’s rights activists had been regularly reporting such brutal 
attacks against women in the public sphere since 2012, this was the irst time 
the state took real measures to deal with such crimes. Seven arrests were 
made in relation to the incident. 4 Moreover, Egypt’s new president Abd 
El-Fattah El-Sissi visited one of the survivors of the harrowing attacks, pre-
sented her with a large bouquet of lowers, and apologized to her in person. 5
1. For examples of such coverage see: The Washington Post report by Eric Cunningham: 
“In Egypt, presidential contender Abdel Fatah al-Sissi appeals to women voters” at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-presidential-contender-abdel-fattah-al-sissi-
appeals-to-women-voters/2014/05/25/eb880eb0-99cd-44d9-ac0e-98e077d2ff33_
story.html and the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy’s report by Sara Abdel Rahim: 
Sissi, the candidate for Egyptian women? At http://timep.org/commentary/sisi-candidate-
for-egyptian-women.
2. For examples of such videos, please see the following links: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=wlfVyq5Y_ek, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEL8kz4EiUU, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkM6C52gI-w.
3. For more details of the incident see: Egypt’s Sissi faces challenge over ‘sexual terror’, 
The Times of Israel: http://www.timesoisrael.com/egypts-sisi-faces-challenge-over-
sexual-terror.
4. For more details on the events of the inauguration on June the 8th 2014 see: Patrick 
Kingsley “ Seven arrested for sexually assaulting student during Tahrir Celebrations: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/seven-arrest-sexual-assault-student-
tahrir-square-sisi-inauguration.





These two strikingly opposed images of women celebrated, venerated, and 
then sexually violated in the midst of national celebrations, point to an import-
ant question that lies at the heart of any discussion on women and the state in 
Egypt: What are the limits of state feminism in a time when debates on women’s 
presence and roles in the public sphere seem to echo wider political debates 
centering on Egypt’s identity and future? The answer to this question is far from 
simple. Apprehending the limits of state feminism in Egypt requires a historical 
and political understanding of the project itself. It also requires comprehension 
of the lopsided nature of the process of modernizing the postcolonial Egyptian 
state. While national imaginations of Egypt as a woman and of the nation as a 
family have been a constant staple of Egyptian nationalism since the late nine-
teenth century, this same nationalism rested on gendered assumptions that are 
far from simple. 6 In this article, I will attempt to unpack those gendered assump-
tions, and demonstrate how those imaginings and their political manifestations, 
have developed in the period following the Arab spring. I will argue that this 
post-June 30th, 2013 edition of gendered nationalist discourse is nevertheless 
unique in many ways, rendering it a new and problematic edition of Egyptian 
state feminism. While it assumes many of the characteristic of earlier statist dis-
courses on women in Egypt, mainly their centering on identity debates, this 
new state feminism is more grounded in concrete political realities. Furthermore, 
it is shaped by different strands of women’s mobilization, some of which are 
radically opposed to historically constructed notions of the proper place of 
women in the nation. However, this new type of state feminism is problematic 
on a number of fronts, and has become increasingly so following Egypt’s June 
30th, 2013 coup, as I will explain.
Contradictory understandings of women’s presence in the public arena 
emerged following the 2011 uprising. On the one hand, the politicization of 
women’s bodies, a result of both the revolutionary and the anti-revolutionary 
waves of mobilization that have swept the country over the past four years, high-
lights the instrumental use of women as political symbols. On the other hand, the 
active and increased participation of women in all the events of the past turbulent 
three years suggests the emergence of a different type of agency, accompanied by 
several alternative gender discourses in Egypt. The eruption of the issue of vio-
lence against women stands out in particular here. While this could be partly 
explained by an actual increase in the intensity and level of violence against 
women, it could also be traced to the emergence of an active consciousness 
among women regarding the extent of the problem, as well as a willingness on 
their part to do something about it. Thus, both the discursive and the practical 
parameters of the debate on women’s bodies in the public space have signii-




it had long occupied. This in turn, has paved the way for the emergence of a 
plethora of gendered frames and symbols that defy easy categorization.
In this article, I attempt to unpack these different old and new discourses 
on women by analyzing in depth the media discourse on women’s unani-
mous support for military rule as the only alternative to the Islamic rule that 
was bound to decrease the scope of rights enjoyed by Egyptian women. In 
order to achieve that, I attempt to deconstruct the myth of “El-Sissi’s women” 
through analyzing images of women as political actors in the media. I argue 
that the politicization of the images of women, dancing in front of polling sta-
tions in the last presidential election, or going on record to express their 
support for El-Sissi as their favorite presidential candidate, represents an 
attempt to construct a new discursive form of state feminism, one that utilizes 
women and their issues to serve political purposes while giving them little in 
return. But this discourse itself is far from simple. On the contrary, I will argue 
that women’s support for El-Sissi represents multiple claims and understand-
ings of women’s rights, as well as different strategic claims on the state at a 
time when the battle over the cultural meanings of women’s rights acquires 
broader political signiicance in the midst of the unprecedented political 
polarization that characterizes Egypt’s failed democratic transition. 
This article is divided into three main parts. In the irst, I analyze what I 
identify as the historical predicament of state feminism in Egypt, and how the 
latest developments it into this analysis. In the second part, I outline how the 
gendered discourses and practices of both the nationalist statist project, and 
the Islamic project sought to utilize women as political symbols. This, in turn, 
has led to the constant framing of debates on women in Egypt in terms of iden-
tity politics and discussions of authenticity. I further elaborate on this point by 
critically analyzing the media portrayals of two distinct but interrelated phe-
nomena: the women who publically supported El-Sissi’s candidacy and his rise 
to power following June 30th, 2013 and the popular assumption that Egyptian 
women en masse are in support of his leadership. By representing those images 
of supposedly authentic Egyptian women in action, and by juxtaposing them 
with the Islamists’ notions of Egyptian womanhood as culturally authentic, I 
aim to show the extent to which discussions of women’s status on a national 
level tend to be trapped in an identity debate that avoids the political side of 
the issue, and aims to prevent constructive debates on the real conditions of 
women in Egypt. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the reasons behind 
the rise of El-Sissi’s women as a phenomenon and how this relates to other 
competing discourses on women’s rights in contemporary Egypt.
STATE FEMINISM IN EGYPT: ROOTS AND REALITIES
In her book Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the state 
in Nassser’s Egypt, historian Laura Bier argues that the gendered and political 
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orders that were put in place by the governing elites in the period following 
nominal independence from Britain in 1923, underwent major changes in the 
wake of the 1952 coup d’état. 7 While the newly-established regime in Egypt 
owed many of its ideas on wider social reforms to earlier social engineering 
attempts begun in the 1920s and 1930s, it signaled a new beginning on sev-
eral important fronts. First, instead of merely relying on charitable initiatives 
by the upper class, the language of social reform entered the phase of scien-
tiic planning by a strong central government. 8 This development paved the 
way for the state’s monopoly over important social issues, both discursively 
and institutionally, including the women’s question.
Second, the discursive and ideological foundations of what later became the 
Nasserist state came to be closely tied to a clear demarcation of the public and 
private domains. More importantly, the new state feminism effectively sought to 
silence a vibrant and rich debate on the women’s question that had taken place 
in the interwar period. This debate shows that different ideals of national wom-
anhood existed and were in competition. 9 While discussions in the 1920s, until 
the 1950s, centered on how increased opportunities for work and education for 
women would inluence their traditional roles as caretakers, mothers and 
housewives, and on how such changes would affect the laws governing inti-
mate relations between men and women within the marriage institution, a 
different discourse arose from the 1960’s onward. This new discourse was cen-
tered mostly on women’s roles as employed workers and as citizens in a new 
type of public space. Issues like marriage, divorce and custody of children were 
regulated and reformed only in a piecemeal manner by the state, and debates 
on women’s status in the private realm became almost nonexistent. 10 One 
important indicator of this can be found in the fact that not a single attempt to 
reform Egypt’s personal status laws was made in the 1950s or 1960s. In fact no 
such attempt was made until 1979, when ill-fated law number 44/1979, popu-
larly known as “Jihan’s law”, was ruled unconstitutional by Egypt’s Supreme 
Constitutional Court. 11 Egypt’s rulers from Nasser to Sadat, to Mubarak simply 
shied away from directly addressing the stark gender inequality codiied in 
Egypt’s personal status laws, which date back to the 1920s. 12 These conlicting 
tendencies have resulted in the current contradictory situation in which Egyptian 
7. Bier: 2011, p. 37. 
8. For more on this argument and on critiques of centralized planning see: Bier: 
2011 and Mitchell: 1991.
9. El-Shakry, Omnia.2007. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in 
Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
10. Badran, Margot. 2009. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. 
Oxford: One world Publications, Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, 
Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, and Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. 
For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, and Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, 
Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 




women ind themselves to this day: while oficial state discourse encour-
ages – at least theoretically – the attainment of more public rights (to education, 
work, and political participation), women are still confronted with serious forms 
of gender inequality within the private domain of the home and family.
This legacy, a product of Nasser’s state and reproduced in slightly different 
forms during the presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak, has had far-reaching 
consequences. The private sphere remains an uncontested stronghold of patri-
archy. Furthermore, while the state’s propaganda has continued to emphasize 
the role played by women in the workplace, nevertheless, it has always sought 
to stress that a woman’s place is irst and foremost at home. This fact was 
enshrined in Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, particularly in article eleven that read 
as follows: 
“The State shall guarantee harmonization between the duties of woman towards 
the family and her work in the society, ensuring her equality status with man in 
ields of political, social, cultural and economic life without violation of the rules 
of Islamic jurisprudence”. 13
Article eleven deserves special attention because it perfectly sums up the 
contradictions inherent in the state’s feminist project in Egypt. The fact that the 
constitution emphasizes a woman’s duties towards her family, as well as the 
state’s role in helping women to reconcile this duty with her role in the public 
sphere, proves that the state’s vision of feminism is deeply inluenced by a belief 
in the sanctity of the family, and in women’s traditional roles in it according to 
certain interpretations of Islamic Shari’a. Signiicantly, the same constitutional 
text appeared again in article ten of the short-lived 2012 constitution, and yet 
again as article eleven in the current 2014 constitution. 14 One important differ-
ence in the 2014 edition is the recognition of the state’s responsibility to end all 
forms of violence against women. However, it remains unclear how this relates 
to the reconciliation of women’s duties in the public and private spheres, and 
what kind of measures the state will actually implement to ensure that.
The above account of the history of state feminism in Egypt highlights three 
important aspects. First, state feminist solutions to the problem of how best to 
ensure the incorporation of women into public life has led to a new envision-
ing of the home (private), and of the workplace and the street (public), as 
gendered spaces. Second, these new imaginings, as expressed in oficial gov-
ernment discourse, were often contradictory, as they sought to balance gender 
relations without actually confronting the root causes of gender inequality in 
the private sphere of the home. Third, as a consequence of the previous two 
aspects, this unresolved contradiction has led to the rise of a social discourse, 
13. Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, article 11.
14. Egypt’s 2012 Constitution, article 10 and Egypt’s 2014 Constitution, article 11. 
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often sanctioned by the state, on how women should behave once they ind 
themselves crossing the boundaries between the private and the public. These 
have included prescriptions on the ways women should carry themselves, how 
they should deal with men, and what they should wear. 15 The idea that the pub-
lic space was gendered, and that it was male, became the dominant logic 
advocated by society and uncontested by the state. This marked Egyptian state 
feminism as an enigma, for it empowered women to enter public space, yet did 
not provide the necessary conditions under which their presence could eventu-
ally lead to substantive improvements in their status.
NATIONALIST VERSUS ISLAMIC WOMEN: IDENTITY WARS
One important point of contention between those supporting the July 3rd, 
2013 coup, and those against it, centers on the position of women and how 
Egypt’s short-lived Islamist government under President Mohamed Morsi, 
sought to roll back the legal gains that Egyptian women had made in the past 
decades. Supporters of the July 3rd coup often singled out women (along with 
Egypt’s Coptic minority) as groups that stood to lose most if the Islamists 
remained in power. The actions undertaken by the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
government seemed to lend strength to this argument. The 2012 constitution 
lacked any mention of gender equality, referring vaguely instead to “equality 
and equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women.” 16 While this was 
seen by some as implicitly referring to legal equality between the sexes, many 
women’s rights advocates saw it as the worst Constitution in Egypt’s history 
regarding gender quality, since it was literally silent on the issue. Public 
debates on the 2012 Constitution and whether it represented a continuation or 
a break from earlier constitutional traditions in Egypt, echoed earlier debates 
on women’s status stretching all the way back from the 1920s and 1930s. 
According to historians writing on this topic, debates on state feminism in 
Egypt culminated in a conservative approach to the question of women’s pres-
ence in the public space, and in a continuous avoidance of the thorny issue of 
the state’s responsibility in promoting gender equality in the private sphere. 
But parallel to this project, there emerged another one; that of turning the 
gender question into a nationalist one. This was achieved through the dual 
tactic of promoting one model of womanhood as ideal, and by representing 
the nation itself as a woman. In her book, Egypt as Woman: Nationalism, 
Gender and Politics, Beth Baron discusses at length the historically rich pro-
cess through which Egyptians, inluenced by Western nationalist traditions, 
15. For more on the origins of state feminism in Egypt under Nasser, see: Bier, Laura. 
2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s 
Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
16. Egypt 2012 Constitution, preamble. 
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portrayed Egypt as a woman in national iconography, vernacular language 
and popular culture. 17 The genealogy of such representations tying women to 
the state, while not exclusive to Egypt, seems to stretch continuously from the 
1920s until the 25th of January, 2011 and the 30th of June, 2013 revolutions. 
References to Egypt as “Bahya” (a woman’s name meaning the beautiful one ) 
and “Omm El Donia” (“mother of the world”) denote an ongoing fascination 
with the image of Egypt as a woman.
This particular model of ideal Egyptian womanhood, closely tied to repre-
sentations of the nation itself as a woman, arose in opposition to the two 
contrasting, Islamist and conservative models. The latter two, that relect 
opposing visions of the nation and its women, along with the national model 
of womanhood explained above, continue to inluence the parameters of 
national discourse on women’s status, as well as its limits.
The irst model is the one promoted by the Islamists. It is based on an ideal 
of womanhood as ascribed by the tenets of Islamic Shari’ a. While the logic of 
state feminism in Egypt rests on a public/private duality that values women’s 
participation in public life on the one hand, and stresses their central role as 
mothers and wives on the other, imaginings of ideal womanhood inspired by 
the Islamic revival in Egypt are focused on a rejection of the logic of equality 
itself as a foreign element of Western origin. 18 While such attitudes toward 
gender equality date back to the early writings of Muslim Brotherhood leaders 
and ideologues, they were very much still alive and a part of recent debates 
following the election of Mohamed Morsi as President in 2012. One incident 
that highlighted this clearly was the statement issued by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in early 2013, in response to a declaration by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, on violence against women. 19 Muslim 
Brotherhood members expressed objections to this statement that formally 
laid out their views on women’s rights for the irst time since their ascent to 
power in June 2012. They included a rejection of the idea of partnership 
between men and women, advocating instead the Islamic notion of “guard-
ianship” of men over women. Furthermore, the statement mentioned that 
wives have no right to ile legal charges against their husbands for rape, and 
that husbands should not be subject to the punishments meted out for the 
rape of a stranger. This statement proved to many that the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
stance on women had remained more or less the same as in the past, despite 
previous allegations by some of its members that MB views had changed. 20
17. Baron,Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
18 Mahmoud, Sabaa. 2004. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19. For the full text of this declaration see: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/
csw57/CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_%28CSW_report_excerpt%29.pdf.
20. For more on the Muslim Brotherhood statement on the UN declaration on vio-
lence against women, see: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731.
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The second new model is more recent, and is yet to be fully articulated. 
But it has already informed and inspireed the more recent forms of women’s 
mobilization that have taken place in the past four years since the January 
25th, 2011 revolution. This new imagery, while similar to that of the ideal 
nationalist model of Egyptian womanhood articulated above, nevertheless 
attempts to push the boundaries of women’s participation to the fullest, and in 
the process, manages to question the very paradigm of the nationalist gender 
discourse. One important way this is done is through an active engagement in 
the issue of women’s bodies in public space. Such an engagement, while 
breaking a long-standing taboo on the growing problem of sexual violence in 
the public sphere, has managed to destabilize the iconic model of national 
womanhood, and its claims on public space in particular. The challenge pre-
sented by such a new wave of “revolutionary feminism” to the older, deeply 
rooted gender discourses in Egypt has been far from simple. While this chal-
lenge seems to be waning now, it has left its mark on the dominant discourses 
on women in the public sphere in a number of interesting ways. I shall return 
to this issue in the concluding section.
EL-SISSI’S WOMEN: FALSE GENERALIZATIONS?
Egypt’s two uprisings (January 25th, 2011 and June 30th, 2013) threw into 
sharp relief all the dynamics summarized above. The oficial gender discourse 
of the state came under attack following the overthrow of Mubarak. State fem-
inism, relegated in the popular imagination to the personality cult surrounding 
Suzanne Mubarak, was viliied as being elitist and far removed from the real 
occupations of Egyptian women. This continued to be the case under the 
short-lived government of Morsi, where an anti-feminist discourse prevailed 
and extended beyond the NCW and state feminism to independent forms of 
mobilization. The Muslim Brotherhood’s attack on women’s rights was inte-
gral to their new vision of the state and society, and part of a wider campaign 
to take over the state’s institutions.
As a result of the Brotherhood’s campaign against women’s rights, a new 
popular discourse articulating the resilience of women in the face of increas-
ing attempts by the Brotherhood to restrict their rights, began to rise. In the 
lead-up to June 30th, 2013, the media in Egypt began to continuously attack 
what they perceived as the threat against women coming from the MB, and 
celebrate the resistance of Egyptian women to this adversary. This discourse 
began to gain momentum in the midst of the mobilization efforts against 
Muslim Brotherhood rule.
Normative visions of women’s liberation from Islamic rule, a discursive 
logic that was only prevalent among secularly-inclined intellectuals, has 
become more popular and tied to hegemonic visions of state control, which 
in effect denotes military control. What is questionable about this new gender 
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discourse is the extent to which such support is real or manufactured, or both. 
An answer to this can be distilled from analyzing and comparing two distinct 
but interrelated phenomena: the discourse of women who publically sup-
ported El-Sissi’s candidacy and his rise to power following June 30th, 2013, as 
well as the more general assumption that Egyptian women en masse support 
his leadership, much more than men. While these two aspects promoted by 
popular media are not the same, they nevertheless feed into a common 
broader narrative on gender in post-June 30th Egypt.
A number of questions arise here: Who are El-Sissi’s women? And to what 
extent do the media representations of those women relect the real reasons 
behind their own choices in aligning with the military against the Muslim 
Brotherhood? Or have their experiences been reconigured and reproduced in 
a hegemonic discourse that is politically motivated? Understanding the phe-
nomena of El-Sissi’s women requires a critical examination of who these 
women are, and the reasons why they are being represented as the quintes-
sential Egyptian women. It also requires analysis of how the state-controlled 
media, as part of its propaganda against Muslim brotherhood rule, incorpo-
rated women in a hegemonic discourse seeking to recreate what could be 
termed a “new hegemonic interpretation of women’s lived experiences”. 21
The emergence of the collective igure of Egyptian women unanimously 
supporting the military in the run-up to June 30th, 2013, involved images of 
women from all classes and areas of Egypt. The idea of presenting women 
from all walks of life, seemingly united in their view of the dangers that the 
Muslim Brotherhood represented to all women in Egypt, began to appear as a 
common feature of both televised and online media outlets. The diversity of 
those women’s experiences and the different reasons why they might have 
chosen to side with the military were intentionally blurred.
In the months preceding June 30th, a particular type of women became 
advocates of this view. This set of women represented a familiar type: those who 
stood to lose the most from the dismantling of the model of state feminism that 
existed under Mubarak. Tahani El Gebali, serving as a Supreme Constitutional 
Court judge, was one of the best-known igures of this group. A regular guest in 
the media at the time, and an articulate speaker, El Gebali provided the neces-
sary legal and political cover for constructing a hegemonic discourse on why the 
Brotherhood’s rule was bad for women. In addition, igures like El Gebali man-
aged to link gendered critiques of the Brotherhood to visions of a promised 
authoritarian rule that would save the day by restoring Egypt’s own version of 
modernity, complete with the public/private division of gender roles, against 
another threatening gender regime promoted by the Islamists. Invoking the 
Nasserist era’s promise of women’s liberation as part and parcel of the nation’s 
21. Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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liberation from Islamic rule, igures like El Gebali created a discourse focused on 
the need to return to the state’s legacy of protective feminism. 22 These arguments 
were mostly constructed around the dangers inherent in the 2012 Constitution, 
how it failed women, and why women needed to mobilize en masse against it.
Other independent female igures, leftists or Nasserists, who also envisioned 
Islamic rule as the major threat facing women in Egypt, joined state feminists in 
their support for the military, albeit less explicitly. One such igure is Shahinda 
Maklad, a veteran activist for peasant rights, and a product of the Nasserist era’s 
state feminism and the new opportunities for education that it opened to 
women. Maklad became a central igure of in a drama of contesting gender 
discourses. During a demonstration against President Morsi in the area around 
the presidential palace in November 2012, Maklad was attacked by a male 
member of the MB’s Freedom and Justice party who, symbolically enough, put 
his hand over her mouth to silence her chanting. The video of the incident went 
viral and constituted a galvanizing tool to mobilize Egyptians against the rule of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the months that followed. 23 Maklad was later inter-
viewed by numerous T.V. channels, further giving voice to a new discourse of 
gendered opposition to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
But El-Sissi’s women are not only state feminists or notable female public 
igures. Those portrayed by the media as El-Sissi’s women also come from 
more common lower-class backgrounds and have only been made famous by 
virtue of their praise of the leader.
Some of those women have become celebrities overnight for vilifying the 
Muslim Brotherhood online. Countless videos of simple Egyptian women 
speaking about El-Sissi’s virility, strength and his other admirable masculine 
traits, began circulating in the period following the 2013 coup. 24 While popular 
discussions of El-Sissi’s female supporters have seemed to center speciically on 
his “masculine appeal”, one dimension that has seemed missing from this 
debate is the extent of many Egyptian women’s sense of vulnerability following 
the increased wave of sexual violence in Egypt in the past three years. One 
recurrent reason often put forward by women from all walks of life for their sup-
port to El-Sissi seems to hinge on the revival of the protective role of the state in 
relation to women. As mentioned in the irst section, state feminist solutions to 
the problem of how best to ensure the incorporation of women into public life 
had more recently failed in providing women with a safe public space. This had 
left women grappling with a paradox that remains true to this day: the public 
sphere might be the only space where women feel that they have any chance of 
22. For more on El-Gibali critiques of Egypt’s 2012 constitution, see: CBS’s report on 
January 8th 2013: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/former-top-court-judge-challenges-
egypt-s-new-constitution-1.1390698.
23. For the video of Shahinda Makled’s incident and an interview with her: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-MsqcaH9UA.




realizing equality. Since gender inequality in the private space remains uncon-
tested, women’s participation in the public sphere, through paid work and 
political participation at all levels, remains the only sphere of gender contesta-
tion in Egypt. To many ordinary Egyptian women from all walks of life, 
remaining part of public space continues to be the goal of mainstream femi-
nism, just as it was during the Nasserist era. This logic, albeit less emphasized 
by hegemonic media discussions of El-Sissi’s women, was nevertheless 
expressed both explicitly and implicitly by many of those women. 25
These larger groups of women who have found El-Sissi appealing as a pro-
tector are also able to legitimately express those views, mainly because of the 
deep-seated conservative discourse of this new brand of state feminism. In this 
sense, this new gendered discourse does not depart much from the contradic-
tions of earlier state feminist projects in Egypt. On the other hand, notable 
public female igures like El-Gebali, Maklad and others who have chosen to 
support El-Sissi might have different motives than common women. For state 
feminists, support from the state, even if it is only nominal, remains their only 
viable option given the attacks on their very existence following January 25th, 
2011. However, it remains clear that women’s support for military rule and for 
El-Sissi is neither a universal phenomenon, nor is it motivated by the same 
reasons or guided by the same logic. On the contrary, El-Sissi’s women repre-
sent diverse individual subjectivities and conlicting constituencies that 
express numerous, competing gender discourses. Moreover, they also repre-
sent only one of many emerging gender discourses that might actually depart 
signiicantly from both the historical model of state feminism in Egypt, and its 
two alternatives: Islamic feminism and revolutionary feminism.
CONCLUSION
In Egypt, a new popular discourse, expressed in vernacular forms of language, 
in the media and in the writings of intellectuals and political analysts, stresses 
the support of “Egyptian women” as a uniform category, for the Egyptian mili-
tary in their war against Islamist terrorism. The portrayal of Egyptian women’s 
universal infatuation with the military General-turned-President overlooks the 
diversity of reasons for which many women supported the military overthrow 
of the Brotherhood. It also overlooks the intentional ways in which the idea of 
universal support was manufactured for political reasons. While the ruling 
military regime did actively promote this image and encourage its circulation 
in the media, it is also the result of the self-promoting efforts of certain statist 
female igures, both in the government and outside it, who simply saw 
25. For examples of this particular discourse, see this video of women explaining why 




themselves as representative of certain interests that would have been hurt, 
had the Muslim Brotherhood continued to rule. 
One source of the manufacturing this image of Egyptian women as one 
uniied group might be found in the attempts by notable state feminists to 
revive a legacy of state feminism that had undergone serious questioning fol-
lowing the January 25th, 2011 revolution. In this sense, El-Sissi’s women as an 
ideological construction, might relect these state feminists’ bid to regain a 
position that they have lost. Another reason might lie in the increasing chal-
lenge that the state faces in combating sexual violence in the public sphere, a 
challenge that the state institutions have failed to meet in any successful way 
so far. Promoting El-Sissi as the great savior of women might also serve to 
lessen public fears about a phenomenon that has seemed to be slipping out of 
control and that threatens women’s presence in the public sphere. In addition, 
the emerging, diverse gender discourses that stress women’s support for the 
new military state as unanimous and uncontested, might also be motivated by 
an attempt to erase a rich three-year history of independent gender-based 
mobilization, especially around the issue of gender violence in the public 
sphere. Although independent mobilization attempts were weakened in the 
period following June 30th, 2013, they have nevertheless managed to chal-
lenge deep-seated patriarchal notions on women’s roles in public space. 
Independent activists, groups and organizations greatly troubled those notions 
by introducing the concept of “body politics” to mainstream national dis-
courses on women. Furthermore, such activism has resulted in signiicant 
changes in the national discourse on sexual violence, prompting for the irst 
time, oficial state recognition of the extent of this problem. 
Thus, understanding the phenomena of El-Sissi’s women requires in turn, 
an understanding of the challenges that state feminist projects in Egypt have 
faced over the past four years. Ironically, El-Sissi’s women, as subjects and as 
ideological and politically-motivated constructions, might be the product of a 
backlash against women by all parties and at the same time, a result of the 
revival in gender discourse in Egypt after 2011. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether any of the emerging discourses on women in Egypt can free 
itself from the trappings of identity politics that have impeded the possibilities 
of independent mobilization for a long time, as well as the emergence of a 
political discourse on women’s rights that is grounded in the reality of wom-
en’s experiences, and not in their supposed political or cultural identities. 
Could such an understanding of women’s rights emerge in Egypt, given the 
latest political developments? As Egypt’s ruling military regime turns into an 
outright dictatorship with thousands arrested and jailed, separating women’s 
rights from politics at large is becoming more dificult. As independent wom-
en’s voices become silenced, and the country sinks more into the grip of 
military dictatorship, Egyptian feminism seems to be sliding more and more 
into the trappings of an endless identity debate. This debate conceals state 
paternalism and its direct role in women’s oppression by highlighting its 
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protective role toward women, and by precluding the emergence of new 
forms of activism that could bridge the fault lines of identity and reclaim a 
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